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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 08-3323
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KEVIN CLEVELAND,
Appellant
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 2:04-00472-002)
Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter, District Judge
______________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 17, 2010
BEFORE:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 8, 2011)
______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
______________
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge
This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from a sentence imposed at a
resentencing on July 15, 2008, followed by an amended judgment entered on July 22,
2008, after we remanded this case for resentencing in our disposition of appellant Kevin
Cleveland’s first appeal.  The prosecution leading to Cleveland’s case arose from two
2robberies that Cleveland committed in Philadelphia on consecutive days in August 2003. 
He committed the first robbery on August 13 when he robbed a pizza delivery man at
gunpoint and took the victim’s cash and car.  The next day Cleveland and Perry Smith
committed an armed robbery at a business called Shernoff Salads.  During the course of
the Shernoff robbery, Cleveland shot Heidi Shernoff, an employee at that business. 
Philadelphia police arrested Cleveland and Smith on August 14, 2003, and thereafter the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged both men with state law crimes.
The prosecutions, however, were federalized when, on April 20, 2004, a federal
grand jury indicted Cleveland for conspiracy to commit robbery which interfered with
interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Count One); interfering and
aiding and abetting interference with interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2 (Count Two); using and carrying and aiding and abetting the use
and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and 2 (Count Three); carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119
(Count Four); and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the carjacking, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Count Five).  The grand jury indicted Smith in the
first three counts of the indictment which related to the Shernoff Salads robbery but it did
not indict him in the last two counts involving the robbery of the pizza delivery man. 
After the District Court dismissed the indictment, without prejudice, by reason of a
Speedy Trial Act violation, a grand jury returned a second indictment against Cleveland
and Smith repeating the charges from the first indictment.
 The sentence also provided for a fine, restitution, and a special assessment but we are1
not concerned with those provisions of the sentence on this appeal.
 We need not explain why the consecutive terms were required as Cleveland does not2
challenge them by asserting that their consecutive imposition was not mandatory. 
3
At the ensuing trial, a jury convicted both defendants on all of the counts of the
indictment against each of them.  Thereafter, on April 14, 2006, the District Court
sentenced Cleveland to a total custodial term of 528 months to be followed by a three
year term of supervised release.   The total custodial sentence reflected concurrent1
custodial terms of 144 months each on Counts One, Two, and Four and consecutive 300-
month and 84-month terms on Count Three and Count Five.  
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) required the District Court to impose the consecutive sentences
totaling 384 months on Counts Three and Five.   But the 144-month custodial sentences2
on Counts One, Two, and Four reflected a substantial downward variance from  the
guidelines sentencing range that the Court calculated.  In making its computations the
Court determined that Cleveland was a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) and
that he had a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI.  Thus, his
guidelines custodial range was 262 to 327 months.  The Court concluded that Cleveland
was a career offender because he had two prior felony convictions for “crimes of
violence”:  a 1992 Pennsylvania conviction for aggravated assault, and a 1993
Pennsylvania conviction for conspiracy and that this case also involved crimes of
violence.  The Court’s determination that Cleveland was a career offender, to the extent
that the Court relied on his 1993 conviction to reach that conclusion, is at the heart of this
appeal.
 Smith also appealed but we are not concerned with his case at this time.3
4
Cleveland appealed from both his conviction and his sentence but we rejected all
of his bases for challenging his conviction and sentence except one.  See United States v.
Smith, 256 F. App’x 497 (3d Cir. 2007).   The limited exception was that we determined3
that the District Court erred in concluding on the basis of the record then before it that
Cleveland’s 1993 conviction for conspiracy constituted a crime of violence.  Id. at 500-
01.
In holding that the District Court erred we observed that the government contended
at Cleveland’s sentencing that the 1993 conspiracy charge on which he had been
convicted had four possible objects, three of which would have been for crimes of
violence but one of which, possession of an instrument of a crime, would not have been
for a crime of violence.  Id.  Nevertheless, because possession of an instrument of a crime
is a first-degree misdemeanor carrying a maximum penalty of a five-year term of
imprisonment, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 907(a), 1104(1) (West 1998), the District Court
reasoned that the state court’s imposition of a five-to-ten year custodial sentence for the
conspiracy conviction established that Cleveland must have been convicted of conspiring
to commit a crime of violence rather than being convicted of possession of an instrument
of crime.  Smith, 256 F. App’x at 500-01.
We, however, rejected that conclusion as it was possible that Cleveland’s
conspiracy charge could have been for a conspiracy to violate the Uniform Firearms Act,
a statute which included punishment for non-violent crimes of the same length as the five-
to-ten year custodial sentence that the state court imposed on him.  Id. at 501.  Inasmuch
5as a violation of the Uniform Firearms Act would not have been for a crime of violence
for career offender purposes under the guidelines, if the conspiracy charge on which there
had been a conviction had as its object a violation of that Act, Cleveland would not have
been a career offender.  Id.  Accordingly, we vacated Cleveland’s sentence and remanded
the case for resentencing.  Id.  Critically, however, we did not reject the possibility that
the conspiracy conviction was for a crime of violence, as we indicated that on the remand
the District Court was not precluded “from resentencing Cleveland as a career offender if
it is able, upon further consideration and/or development of the record, to determine that
[his] conspiracy conviction pertained to a crime of violence.”  Id.  Thus, our remand was
for a very limited redetermination, and, of course, the resentencing depended on the
District Court’s conclusions on that redetermination.
The District Court held a new sentencing hearing on July 15, 2008.  At that
hearing the government presented evidence that it had not presented at Cleveland’s
original sentencing in support of its argument that Cleveland’s 1993 conviction was for a
conspiracy to commit a crime of violence.  This evidence consisted of a certified copy of
the criminal complaint containing the conspiracy charge and a copy of the portion of the
transcript from Cleveland’s 1993 trial in which the judge charged the jury on the
conspiracy charge.  Based on this additional evidence, the District Court readopted its
finding that Cleveland’s 1993 conspiracy conviction was for a crime of violence, which
meant that the Court’s initial determination that Cleveland was a career offender had been
correct.  
6Nevertheless, on the resentencing the conscientious District Court made a plenary
analysis of the factors leading to its calculation of Cleveland’s guidelines range.  The
Court began by applying the guidelines grouping rules and determining that Cleveland’s
convictions on Counts One and Two, formed one group, and his carjacking conviction on
Count Four constituted a second group.  The Court determined that for the first group
Cleveland’s base offense level was 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, but there would be a 4-
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(B) because a victim, Heidi Shernoff,
had suffered a serious bodily injury.  However, inasmuch as Cleveland was a career
offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, his offense level for this group was 32.
The District Court then determined that the base offense level for Cleveland’s
carjacking conviction was also 20, but that there would be a 2-level enhancement to his
sentencing level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(5), because the offense involved
carjacking.  Inasmuch as Cleveland was a career offender, the total adjusted offense level
for this group was 29.  The Court then assigned one unit to each group, and determined
that 2 points should be added to the offense level for the first group for a total offense
level of 34.
The District Court also determined that Cleveland had 9 criminal history points, a
number that ordinarily would have placed him in criminal history category IV.  However,
because Cleveland was a career offender, his criminal history category was increased to
level VI.  The attorneys agreed with these rather complex calculations, and Cleveland
does not challenge them on this appeal beyond contending that he is not a career offender.
7The District Court pointed out that, with a total offense level of 34 and a criminal
history category of VI, under the guidelines Cleveland’s sentencing range was for a
custodial term of  262-327 months for his convictions on Counts One, Two, and Four. 
The Court, however, granted a substantial downward variance on those counts, and again
imposed a custodial sentence of 144 months on those counts.  When combined with the
statutorily mandated sentences of 84 months on Count Five and 300 months on Count
Three, both to run consecutively to any other sentence, the Court again imposed a total
custodial sentence on Cleveland of 528 months.  The Court entered an amended
judgment, in accordance with its findings on July 22, 2008.  Cleveland then filed this
appeal.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, see United States v.
Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 1999), but review the District Court’s findings of
fact to determine if they were clearly erroneous.  See United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d
464, 467 (3d Cir. 1997).
Cleveland argues that the District Court erred when it held that he was a career
offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) because the government did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the 1993 conviction for conspiracy was for a “crime
of violence.”  Cleveland’s contention that the District Court’s determination with respect
to the 1993 conspiracy conviction was erroneous presents the only issue that we address
on this appeal.
8There are three requirements for a defendant to be classified as a career offender
under the guidelines:  (1) the defendant must have been at least 18 years old at the time
that he committed the crime for which the court is sentencing him; (2) the crime for
which the court is sentencing him must have been a “crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense;” and (3) the defendant must have a prior criminal record with “at least
two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  The guidelines define “crime of violence” to include any
offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, that:  (1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another,” or (2), so far as germane here, “otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  U.S.S.G. §
4B1.2(a).
Cleveland does not dispute that he was older than 18 years of age when he
committed any of his current federal offenses, and he does not contend that his current
convictions do not include crimes of violence.  Moreover, on his original appeal he
conceded that his 1992 conviction for aggravated assault was a felony conviction for a
“crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), see Smith, 256 F. App’x at 500, and he
does not contend otherwise on this appeal.  Consequently, as we have indicated, the only
issue on this appeal is whether Cleveland’s 1993 conviction for conspiracy was for a
crime of violence.  Indeed, Cleveland admits as much for in his brief he states that the
issue on appeal is “[w]hether the District Court erred in its determination that [his prior
9conviction] for conspiracy constituted a crime of violence, permitting the Court to
characterize [him] as a career offender . . . .”  Appellant’s br. at 5.
The conspiracy statute under which Cleveland was convicted, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 903(a) (West 1998), provides that a person is guilty of conspiracy “if with the
intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:  (1) agrees with such other person or
persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such
crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (2) agrees to aid such other
person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or
solicitation to commit such crime.”  Under the sentencing guidelines a conspiracy
conviction qualifies as a crime of violence if the predicate crime for that conspiracy was,
itself, a crime of violence.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) app. note 1 (stating that a crime of
violence includes conspiring to commit such an offense).   Thus, in United States v.
Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1998), the Court of Appeals pointed out that “[w]e
have . . . unequivocally held that conspiracy to commit a crime of violence, as defined in
the career offender guidelines, is itself a crime of violence for purposes of its treatment
under the Guidelines.”  Accordingly, a determination of whether the conspiracy for which
Cleveland was convicted was a crime of violence depends entirely on a determination of
whether the crime which Cleveland and his co-conspirators conspired to commit was a
crime of violence.
Experience has shown that it is not always clear from a judgment whether a
defendant’s conviction was for a crime of violence.  When the judgment is not clear on
this point a sentencing court in a later case may examine the charging documents and jury
 In Pennsylvania certain murders are second degree offenses.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §4
2502(b) (West 1998).
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instructions from the earlier case to assist it in making that determination.  See Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1257 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2160 (1990); United States v. Siegal, 477 F.3d 87, 90-93
(3d Cir. 2007).  We reiterate that on the remand following Cleveland’s first appeal the
District Court expanded the record so that it included both the state court criminal
complaint charging Cleveland with conspiracy and the jury instructions from his 1993
trial on that charge.  When these documents are examined, it is clear that Cleveland was
convicted of a conspiracy to commit murder, which is unquestionably a crime of
violence.
We reach this conclusion for the following reasons.  Cleveland’s state court
criminal complaint identified the conspiracy charge as a felony in the second degree and 
included, inter alia, two charges of murder and a charge of aggravated assault, which, like
murder, is a crime of violence.  Under Pennsylvania law the conspiracy charge had the
same classification and degree as the murder charge, as that charge was the most serious
charge that was an object of the conspiracy.  18 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 905(a) (West
1998).   Thus, the criminal complaint made it clear that Cleveland was charged with a4
conspiracy to commit a crime of violence.  
Yet the mere fact that the charge against Cleveland included a crime of violence
does not mean that he was convicted for committing a crime of violence as the criminal
complaint included charges of conspiracy to commit offenses that were not crimes of
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violence.  But the court’s charge to the jury established that Cleveland was convicted of a
conspiracy to commit murder and not a conspiracy to commit a lesser charge that was not
a crime of violence.  At the conclusion of the 1993 trial, the state court instructed the jury
on the elements of the offenses charged which included a conspiracy which the judge
repeatedly characterized as a “conspiracy to commit murder”:
The defendants have been charged with here a conspiracy to commit murder.
* * *
Therefore, in order to find the defendant guilty of a conspiracy to commit murder you
must be satisfied initially the following two elements of a conspiracy have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt:  First, that the defendant agreed with another person or
persons that they or one or more of them would engage in conduct which constitutes the
crime of murder, and secondly, that the defendant did so with the intent of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the crime of murder.
Supp. App. at 77-79.  In fact, the state trial judge did not instruct the jury that any of the
defendants had been charged with conspiracy to commit any crimes other than murder.
Moreover, the judge mentioned only one alleged overt act that the defendants
undertook in furtherance of the conspiracy, the killing of two people:
Now, it is not necessary that the crime which is the object of the conspiracy be committed
or even attempted.  That is because the essence of the crime of conspiracy is the
agreement itself.  However, it is necessary that at least one of the parties do something
more than merely conspiring with his fellow conspirators.  After the conspiracy comes
into existence he must perform an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy.
* * *
One overt act is sufficient.  However, you must all agree on the same overt act.
* * *
No person may be convicted of conspiracy unless an overt act in pursuance of the
conspiracy is alleged and proven to have been done by him or by a person with whom he
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conspired.  In the case it is alleged that the killing of Ronald Bradley and Aaron Hainey
was the overt act.
Supp. App. at 78-79.  Thus, the 1993 conspiracy conviction was for a conspiracy to
commit murder, certainly a crime of violence.
In reaching our conclusion, we have not overlooked Cleveland’s argument that the
jury instructions provide inadequate evidence of the nature of the conspiracy charge
because they did not distinguish between the other defendants charged in the case and
Cleveland.  Rather, we reject that argument.  The criminal complaint establishes that
Cleveland was one of the defendants charged with criminal conspiracy and the judgment
from the 1993 case establishes that Cleveland was convicted of that charge.  Accordingly,
when the state judge provided the jury with instructions on conspiracy, those instructions
applied to Cleveland as he was one of the defendants on trial.  Indeed, on this appeal
Cleveland does not contend that he objected in the state court to the charge on the basis
that it was not clear as to which defendant or defendants the charge applied.  Thus,
Cleveland does not contend that, at the state court trial, Cleveland argued that the state
court needed to identify Cleveland by name to include him among the defendants to
whom the conspiracy to murder instructions applied.
We also have not overlooked Cleveland’s argument that because he was acquitted
of the substantive crime of murder, his conspiracy conviction may have pertained to some
other crime.  This argument fails because the state trial judge told the jury that the crime
that was the object of the conspiracy did not have to be committed or even attempted for
it to convict the defendant of the conspiracy to commit the crime.  Thus, the fact that the
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jury acquitted Cleveland of the substantive crime of murder is immaterial in a
determination of the identification of the object of the conspiracy for which that state jury
convicted him.  Moreover, we reiterate that, given the jury instructions, the object of that
conspiracy undoubtedly was the commission of a murder.  We also point out that in view
of the trial court’s charge which Cleveland does not claim incorrectly stated the law, it
cannot be said that the jury returned an inconsistent verdict when it acquitted Cleveland
of murder but convicted him of conspiracy to commit murder.  
Overall, it is clear from the charging documents and the jury instructions relating
to Cleveland’s 1993 conspiracy that the jury convicted him of conspiracy to commit
murder.  Consequently, the conspiracy conviction meets the definition of a “crime of
violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) and, accordingly, the District Court correctly
determined that Cleveland was a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
For the foregoing reasons the amended judgment of conviction and sentence
entered on July 22, 2008, will be affirmed.
